Schedule A Litigation at a Crossroads: TROs, Service-of-Process, and the 2025 Turning Point in Cross-Border E-Commerce Enforcement

Summit Law Team · IP Litigation · 2026-01-26 · 5 min read

For cross-border e-commerce sellers in Shenzhen—and across China—this has been the shared nightmare of the last few years.

In the dockets of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (NDIL) and the Southern District of New York (SDNY), tens of thousands of Chinese sellers have been tucked away inside a mysterious attachment: Schedule A.

In recent years, Schedule A “mass defendant” litigation has become one of the core legal weapons used by global brand owners to combat counterfeit goods in cross-border e-commerce markets. Concentrated largely in NDIL, this strategy allows a plaintiff to sue hundreds—or even thousands—of typically China-based anonymous online sellers in a single case, obtain an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to freeze assets held by payment processors (PayPal), platforms (Amazon), or other third-party payment channels, and then serve process by email—sidestepping the slow and costly procedures of the Hague Service Convention.

But heading into 2025, the legal foundation that propped up this model began to crumble—fast. Current judicial trends show that Schedule A litigation is entering its darkest hour, with plaintiffs facing a dramatically higher bar.

I. What Is “Schedule A” Litigation?

With the explosive growth of global e-commerce, traditional IP enforcement often fails when infringement is carried out by tens of thousands of anonymous cross-border sellers. Many infringers exploit the anonymity of platforms like Amazon and eBay, cycling through storefronts and accounts to evade enforcement. For brand owners, suing each fleeting storefront one-by-one is prohibitively expensive—and by the time a judgment arrives, the seller has often vanished and moved the money.

To address this reality, federal courts—most notably NDIL and S.D. Florida (SDFL)—gradually developed a specialized mechanism now widely known as Schedule A litigation. The name comes from the plaintiff’s practice of listing hundreds of defendants in a sealed attachment (“Schedule A”), rather than publicly naming them in the body of the complaint, to prevent defendants from catching wind before assets are frozen.

This model runs on three procedural shortcuts:

1. Mass Joinder (FRCP 20): Plaintiffs rely on an expansive reading of Rule 20, claiming hundreds of unrelated sellers are part of the “same transaction or occurrence,” or a series of transactions.

2. Ex Parte TRO: Plaintiffs seek a TRO without notice to defendants, freezing assets immediately.

3. Alternative Service (Rule 4(f)(3)): Courts authorize service by email or web publication, bypassing the Hague Service Convention.

Over time, Schedule A cases evolved into an industrialized, highly repeatable business model. In 2025, however, courts began to push back aggressively—concluding that what started as rights protection has, in too many cases, morphed into procedural abuse.

II. The Service-of-Process Crisis: Smart Study and the Return of the Hague Convention

If the ex parte TRO is the spear of Schedule A litigation, then email service is its legs. A late-2025 appellate decision in the Second Circuit effectively shattered that mechanism in New York—and sent shockwaves nationwide.

On December 18, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi (“Smart Study”), a Baby Shark copyright case that became the defining test for email service on China-based defendants.

The court’s core holdings:

• The Hague Convention is exclusive when it applies. Where the Hague Service Convention applies (i.e., the defendant’s address is known), its methods are exclusive.

• Email (and postal) service to China is prohibited in that context. Because China has objected to Article 10(a) (service by postal channels), and the Convention does not explicitly authorize email service, serving China-based defendants by email was held impermissible.

• Rule 4(f)(3) cannot override a treaty. The court rejected the argument that Rule 4(f)(3) (“any means not prohibited by international agreement”) allows courts to order email service notwithstanding Hague. A federal rule cannot trump a treaty.

Notably, the Second Circuit also relied on China’s Civil Procedure Law—Article 284 (now Article 294 after the 2023 amendment)—as key support for the conclusion that unsolicited service inside China without approval violates Chinese law, reinforcing why such methods cannot be shoehorned into permissible service pathways.

Although Smart Study is formally binding only within the Second Circuit (New York, Connecticut, Vermont), its influence has spread rapidly. The same issue is now queued up in two other Schedule A strongholds:

• Seventh Circuit (NDIL’s appellate court): Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co. (No. 25-2205) is pending. Given NDIL judges’ recent skepticism toward Schedule A practices, the Seventh Circuit may adopt reasoning similar to Smart Study.

• Eleventh Circuit (SDFL’s appellate court): ADIDAS AG v. localityi (No. 25-12597) is also pending.

If both circuits follow the Second Circuit’s path, Schedule A’s low-cost “rapid service” engine will face systemic collapse.

III. NDIL’s Internal Reckoning: From Safe Harbor to Battleground

NDIL was once the safe harbor for Schedule A filings. In 2025, it became the proving ground for dismantling them.

(A) Eicher Motors: Taking the Schedule A Machine Apart

In spring 2025, Judge Kness paused all new Schedule A cases on his docket to reassess the mechanism. In August, he issued a decision in Eicher Motors Ltd. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule “A” (No. 25-cv-02937) and landed on a blunt conclusion:

“The Schedule A mechanism should not continue in its current form.”

His reasoning struck at the model’s foundations:

• Rejecting ex parte TROs (as routinely presented): He criticized plaintiffs’ submissions as often boilerplate and overly generalized—insufficient to show that each defendant presents the urgent risk of evidence destruction or asset flight required for ex parte relief.

• Condemning long-term sealing: He questioned the routine sealing of parties and dockets, citing harm to public access and the loss of adversarial testing.

• Deconstructing mass joinder: Selling similar products on the same platform, even under the same brand, is not enough to make unrelated sellers part of the same “transaction.” This is an economic body-blow: without joinder, plaintiffs could be forced to pay $405 per defendant—multiplying filing fees by hundreds of times.

(B) Dyson: District-Court Resistance and Appellate Correction

Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store (132 F.4th 526, 7th Cir. 2025) shows the tension between NDIL trial judges and the Seventh Circuit over what Schedule A plaintiffs should be allowed to recover.

At the district-court level, Judge Seeger awarded Dyson a win but refused to treat gross sales revenue as profits for purposes of disgorgement. He emphasized that revenue ≠ profit, and denied the requested profits award, instead granting only modest statutory damages—reflecting a trial-court instinct to curb windfall-style recoveries in mass cases.

On March 24, 2025, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Citing Lanham Act § 35 (15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)), it held that the plaintiff need only prove the defendant’s sales; proving costs and deductions is the defendant’s burden. Where defendants default and offer no cost evidence, sales can be treated as profits by legal presumption.

But here’s the nuance—and the warning shot. The Seventh Circuit went out of its way to underscore trial-court discretion:

• “The Lanham Act does give district courts the ability to modify an award of profits if the court deems the modification just.”

• On remand, the district court “retains the discretion” to award more or less than the profits amount, so long as it makes fact-based findings.

Translation: a district judge can’t simply refuse to apply the statute, but can still limit the award through detailed factual findings—especially where a full award would be inequitable or excessive. For plaintiffs, this signals a future of tougher, defendant-specific scrutiny.

(C) The New Red Line: Rule 11 Sanctions and Attorney Discipline

This is the most alarming trend for plaintiffs and their counsel: NDIL judges are no longer merely denying motions—they are increasingly invoking FRCP 11 to sanction lawyers.

Examples include:

1. Lack of evidence: In Nike, Inc. v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry Co. (1:25-cv-03777), Judge Daniel warned that Nike provided no evidence that the defendant infringed the LEBRON mark, emphasizing that past approvals don’t excuse present Rule 11 obligations.

2. False or baseless assertions: In Dorna Sports, S.L. v. Schedule A and Grumpy Cat Ltd. v. Schedule A, Judge Daniel criticized declarations claiming defendants would destroy evidence or hide assets—while counsel admitted they had never interacted with those defendants. He called such boilerplate allegations unacceptable and rejected “this is how it’s always been done here” as a defense.

3. Insufficient investigation: Judge Ellis sanctioned a plaintiff in Yan v. Schedule A for filing without adequate investigation or resources.

Crackdown on Judge-Shopping

In 2025, multiple NDIL judges openly criticized—and in some cases sanctioned—efforts to manipulate case assignment to avoid strict judges, including Judge Tharp (Dongguan Deego Trading Company, Ltd. v. Junyao-US) and Judge Pacold (Huang v. Shenzhen Zhaocheng Technology Co., Ltd.).

NDIL has clearly noticed—and is actively policing—attempts to game the system.

IV. Looking Ahead to 2026: High Cost, High Burden, and a War of Attrition

With NDIL’s sharp turn and the Second Circuit’s service-of-process blockade, Schedule A plaintiffs are entering a new era.

(A) Forced Strategy Shifts

1. Strategic retreat from mass filings: With Rule 11 exposure rising, counsel will think twice before lumping hundreds of unrelated defendants into one complaint—or relying on template declarations to secure ex parte TROs.

2. A partial return to traditional Hague service: In the Second Circuit post-Smart Study, plaintiffs will often be forced back to Hague service. That means 6–12 months per defendant, plus translation and administrative costs.

(B) 2026: The New Normal

1. The “easy money” era is over: The days of winning ex parte TROs and default judgments through mass templates and mass emails are fading. Plaintiffs will need stronger defendant-specific evidence (including test buys) that can survive Rule 11 scrutiny.

2. Smaller awards, tougher damages fights: Dyson suggests trial judges may increasingly use their discretion—grounded in facts—to avoid outsized profit awards.

3. Higher professional risk: As courts begin sanctioning counsel, the practice risk of running Schedule A cases rises sharply—likely pushing some lower-end enforcement firms out of the market.

Closing: The Wheel Is Turning

2025 was the turning point for Schedule A litigation.

If Smart Study cut off its legs by dismantling email service, and Eicher Motors broke its bones by attacking joinder and sealing, then NDIL’s growing willingness to impose Rule 11 sanctions is the blade at the throat of the lawyers who built the machine.

For cross-border sellers, compliance remains non-negotiable—but the risk of “procedural ambush” and abusive asset freezes is measurably declining. For brand owners, enforcement is being pushed back toward what courts increasingly demand: targeted defendants, strong evidence, and clean procedure.

The low-cost, high-return era of mass harvesting is being crushed under the wheels of history.